With the rise of populism on both sides of the political scpectrum, raising new oppositions, is the traditional left/right political divide still relevant to understand contemporary European societies? Four experts from Europe and beyond answer this critical question.
This commentary was first published in QUERIES, Spring 2015, p. 27-31
Saara Inkinen, Research Fellow of the Research Unit Democracy and Democratization
In a recent interview with the Financial Times, the ceding Prime Minister Alexander Stubb was asked to reflect upon his time in office with an eye to the upcoming Finnish parliamentary elections on April 19. His response was as short as it was poignant: his premiership had been a „traumatic experience“.[i] Looking back on the four years that have passed since the last parliamentary elections in 2011, it is not difficult to see what prompted Stubb to make this statement. Finnish politics has traditionally been guided by the principle of consensus, which has allowed political elites across the left-right spectrum to reach pragmatic compromises on core societal issues. Yet the past parliamentary term has been anything but consensual. Not only has the coalition government been torn by internal disagreements almost since the day of its inception; it has also proven incapable of taking much-needed political action to combat a shrinking economy, rising unemployment rates and a state budget deficit that is predicted to swell to 124 billion Euros in the coming years. In short, Stubb’s cabinet is at real risk to go down in history as one of the worst governments the country has ever had.
Mit Sorge hat so mancher am vergangenen Wochenende auf die Wahlen in Griechenland geblickt. Würde sich das Wahlvolk vom Versprechen auf ein Ende der Sparpolitik leiten lassen, würde es dem Linksbündnis Syriza gelingen, stärkste Partei zu werden, und wäre dadurch die Stabilität des gesamten Euroraums gefährdet? Was kann man noch von einem demos erwarten, der mit täglich neuen ökonomischen Hiobsbotschaften konfrontiert ist? Wer solche Befürchtungen äußert, hat eines verloren: das Vertrauen in die Institutionen der Demokratie, in ihre Legitimation, in die Effizienz und Effektivität ihrer Entscheidungen. Dieser Verlust an Vertrauen kann reale Gründe haben. Können – wie in extremis in Griechenland – die demokratisch legitimierten Institutionen, Organisationen und Verfahren nationalstaatlicher Demokratien überhaupt noch jene politischen Entscheidungen treffen, wofür sie der demos gewählt hat? Entsprechen die seit den 1970er Jahren lauter werdenden Stimmen, dass die etablierten Demokratien in einer tiefen Krise stecken und schon die Phase postdemokratischer Ordnungen erreicht haben, der Realität? Lässt sich der theoretische Krisendiskurs durch empirische Demokratieforschung beglaubigen? Weiterlesen
All eyes are now turned to Brazil, the „country of football“, which happens to host this year’s World Cup. Weeks before the start of the tournament, international newspapers were already filling their pages with articles about Brazil’s purported many problems: inequality, poverty, criminality, corruption, and massive protests all over. Television programs also featured infrastructure deficiencies everywhere, making the audience wonder whether international football stars would get stuck on unfinished roads and airports, besides facing the poor living conditions supposedly faced by Brazilian people every day. The sunny beaches and the beautiful tropical landscape have surely also been broadcasted, contrasted with sad images from the country’s many favelas and slums. In almost all means of communications, journalists spent weeks doing political analysis just as well as they did football predictions. Weiterlesen
Throughout the past two centuries, capitalism and democracy have proven themselves to be the most successful systems of economic and political order. Following the demise of Soviet-style socialism and the transformations of China’s economy, capitalism has become predominant across the world. The success of democracy in the last quarter of the twentieth century was equally impressive. Compared to capitalism, however, its success is much less complete. Weiterlesen
A key assumption coming out of the 2012 presidential election in the U.S. was that polarization of the party system was, once again, increasing dramatically. The 2012 campaign was immediately dubbed the most polarized and partisan yet – a familiar declaration given that 2008, 2004, and 2000 had also been dubbed the most polarized elections of their respective times. Uniquely, though, instead of justifying this declaration solely on the basis of presidential candidates‘ positions the platforms themselves were also held up as key evidence. ((See, e.g., NY Times 29.8.2012, 05.09.2012; Washington Times 27.08.2012; Chicago Tribune 27.08.2012, 05.09.2012.)) The question, then, is the extent to which the polarization of the 2012 election reported by media sources reflected actual levels of polarization. Using newly coded party manifesto data ((You can find a brief introduction to the manifesto project here)) from the 2012 national level elections, we show that (contrary to popular opinion) polarization levels for the 2012 elections were relatively stable. The overall trend in polarization for the U.S. remains unchanging and the party system is not suffering from great increases in overall polarization levels. Weiterlesen
MARKUS HORELD von ZEIT ONLINE hat ein Interview mit Wolfgang Merkel geführt. Es geht um das Für und Wider bundesweiter Volksentscheide. ((Auf ZEIT ONLINE findet ihr es hier.)) Lest selbst:
Als Enrico Letta die mit Spannung erwartete Vertrauensabstimmung des italienischen Parlaments am 2. Oktober 2013 gewann, fand sein Kräftemessen mit dem ehemaligen Ministerpräsidenten Silvio Berlusconi ein überraschendes Ende. Nicht ohne Grund werteten zahlreiche Beobachter das Votum als Zeitenwende in der italienischen Politik. Angesichts Berlusconis zahlreicher streitbarer Initiativen, Stichwort Justizreform, sagt das politikwissenschaftliche Bauchgefühl, dass Italiens Demokratie in der „Ära Berlusconi“ nicht nur anders, sondern auch „schlechter“ war als bspw. die Demokratie Finnlands. Die Suche nach einer systematisch quantifizierenden Begründung dieser Intuition bleibt jedoch zunächst ergebnislos, denn die etablierten Demokratieratings von Freedom House oder Polity IV helfen nicht weiter. Schließlich weisen sie Italien nur die Bestnoten zu. Ebenso scheinen die USA trotz des US PATRIOT Acts a priori für die besten Bewertungen fest gebucht. Gleiches gilt für nahezu alle älteren Demokratien der OECD-Welt, welchen sowohl die Freedom House Skalen für political rights und civil rights als auch der Polity IV-Index unisono die Höchstnoten 1 bzw. 10 verleihen. Weiterlesen